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GOVERNING PARTNERSHIPS 
 
Chris Skelcher 
Institute of Local Government Studies 
University of Birmingham UK 
 
Abstract 
 
Public private partnerships (PPPs) are instruments of the public interest, yet bodies 
that actively engage private actors.  As a result, questions of governance are 
particularly important.  Here, governance refers to the rules that prescribe who 
should make, execute and be accountable for the conduct of a PPP, and in what way 
that conduct should be exercised, for example through consultation with interested 
parties, transparency in decision-making, and so on.  This chapter explores four 
facets of PPP governance: legal, regulatory, democratic, and corporate governance.  
Legal governance has implications for the allocation of roles and responsibilities 
between the parties to the PPP, the PPP entity itself, and the state and citizens more 
widely.   Regulatory governance covers the legal and contractual obligations on 
parties, the procedures through which they are enforced, and the softer norms that 
operate around these.  Democratic governance concerns the empirical and normative 
question of what is, and what should be, the level and form of constitutional oversight 
of PPPs.  Corporate governance concerns itself with ensuring that the enterprise is 
managed in a manner that does not put the future of the business and investors funds 
at undue risk.   The chapter concludes that the key task in developing the governance 
of PPPs is less to do with their financial probity, and more with aligning their mode 
of operating to the fundamental democratic values of the wider public service. 
 
 
The significance of PPP governance 
 
PPPs are a sub-set of the tools of government – institutional arrangements through 
which public policy is mediated.  Their status as instruments of the public interest, yet 
bodies that actively engage private actors, means that questions of governance are 
particularly important.  The design of appropriate governance mechanisms provides a 
way in which that public interest can be protected despite the delegation of authority 
to business concerns.  It creates constraints on the agency of private actors, reducing 
possibilities for self-interested behaviour at the state‟s expense.  And in 
contradistinction to the first point, governance structures act as a constraint to the 
state, enabling private actors to realise the innovative potential that PPPs are intended 
to promote by virtue of not being part of the state‟s bureaucracy.  In other words, they 
promote opportunities for self-governance of public activity by private actors at arm‟s 
length to the state (Baker, Justice and Skelcher 2009). 
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The tension between these two purposes of PPP governance is evident in the policy 
and practice of PPPs, although the weight given to one or the other is influenced by 
the ideological stance of the observer.  Those seeing PPPs from a statist position will 
emphasise the need to ensure that governance protects the public interest, and thus 
favour rather more in the way of rules and safeguards than observers who regard PPPs 
as a way through which risk can be transferred, innovation released and public benefit 
enhanced.  Every PPP failure brings a call for reform in the regulatory framework; but 
whether this should be enhanced or reduced regulation is a matter of ideological 
predisposition.  
 
It is also important to contextualise the debate about PPPs and their governance.  
Some countries, such as the UK, have developed considerable experience with the use 
of PPPs, a development facilitated by some three decades of neo-liberal political 
consensus and a well-established set of norms regarding property rights and legal 
compliance.  Asian countries have social and cultural norms that differ from those in 
Europe and the US, and PPP governance therefore is somewhat different (Common 
2000).  And within Europe itself, there are significant differences in national contexts 
that need to be taken into account.  For example, Hofmeister and Borchert (2004) 
argue that Switzerland‟s culture of consensual decision-making and incremental 
change, combined with recent significant business failures in that nation, have 
increased scepticism towards public management reforms based on business models. 
 
Governance, then, is inimical to the debate about PPPs.  Governance is a widely used 
and seldom defined term.  In the context of this chapter it refers to the rules that 
prescribe who should make, execute and be accountable for the conduct of a PPP, and 
in what way that conduct should be exercised, for example through consultation with 
interested parties, transparency in decision-making, and so on.  These rules may be 
defined a priori by government, an international regulatory agency, or some other 
legitimate actor.  They can also emerge more informally as the day-to-day practices of 
actors involved with the PPP become institutionalised.  The result is a situation where 
publicly legitimated rules sit alongside those that are determined privately (Mathur 
and Skelcher 2005).  This chapter explores four facets of PPP governance: legal, 
regulatory, democratic and corporate governance.  The emphasis is on publicly 
legitimated forms of governance; the implication of emergent private rulemaking 
requires a fuller treatment than is possible here (see, for example, Weimar 2006).  The 
chapter concludes with a discussion of the future governance of PPPs. 
 
Legal governance 
 
PPPs can take a number of legal forms.  Each has implications for the allocation of 
roles and responsibilities between the parties to the PPP, the PPP entity itself, and the 
state and citizens more widely.  The exact form of legal governance will depend on 
the legislative framework and constitutional norms of individual nations and their 
relevant jurisdictions.  However a number of overall types can be identified (table 1).   
 
---- table 1 about here ---- 
 
 
Public corporations are a longstanding instrument for state enterprises, regulatory 
bodies, and arm‟s-length service delivery (Wettenhall 1998).  In a PPP context, public 
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corporations can provide a legal structure that retains a strong connection to the state 
and thus in theory, but not inevitably, to public interest concerns.   
 
Companies offer the same benefits as public corporations in terms of enabling the PPP 
to be composed of a single, independently constituted legal entity for a PPP.  But 
unlike public corporations, which have a statutory origin, companies operate under a 
regime of commercial law.  Their establishment thus depends on registration with the 
relevant regulators.  Some companies are limited by shares.  For example, some of the 
PPPs undertaking the improvement of the London Underground are companies whose 
shares are owned either by a consortium of construction firms or to investors accessed 
through the market.  In this way, the PPP can attract outside investment by selling 
equity stakes in the company.  The benefits of this arrangement have to be considered 
alongside the disadvantage, which is that the ownership of the PPP can change over 
time and its value can vary in light of stock market conditions.  An alternative 
arrangement is for the company to be limited by guarantee (the term used may vary 
depending on the company law of different nations), in which case the members of the 
company agree to pay a nominal amount to any debtors should the company cease 
trading.  This approach maintains ownership in the hands of members, but restricts the 
company‟s ability to access external financing by selling equity.  
 
Rather than constituting a separate corporate entity, contracts are widely used as a 
form of legal governance for PPPs.  The contract sets out the obligations of the two or 
more parties involved in the PPP, including what is to be delivered or achieved, the 
payment schedule, discretion on the agent, and the principal‟s rights of oversight.  
Private Finance Initiative (PFI) PPPs frequently utilise contracts as the form of legal 
governance.  Other than very simple contracts, specification can never be complete 
and this opens the way for opportunism by the agent and the possibility of legal 
disputes regarding the exact meaning of terms.   
 
A form of PPP often used for community-based partnerships is the memorandum of 
understanding (MoU) or unincorporated association.  This is a non-corporate entity 
created on the basis of an agreement between the individual member bodies, and 
setting out the purpose of the partnership and how it will be governed.  MoU PPPs do 
not have a separate legal identity and thus cannot enter into contracts, employ staff, or 
own or control assets.  These functions, if necessary, are normally undertaken by one 
of the member organisations (often a statutory body) on behalf of the partnership.   
This form of legal governance offers the most flexibility and least constraints on its 
members.  It can be created, adapted and closed as the members‟ desire.  The agency 
role performed by the organisation nominated to manage contracts and assets means 
that the PPP can effectively spend resources and undertake activities with a financial 
dimension, but without the formality or constraints of a company or public 
corporation.  The disadvantage is that the voluntary agreement that created the PPP 
may not be sustainable over time, and thus this arrangement is not suitable for typical 
large PPP infrastructure projects. 
 
Some countries have common ownership forms of legal governance, for example co-
operatives and mutual societies, in other words non-state public interest companies.  
The advantage of this form is that it relaxes some of the legal requirements that apply 
to normal profit-seeking companies, because it is recognised that a public interest 
company is working for the wider public benefit not a narrow private interest.  This 
 4 
can help to overcome some of the constraints on directors in companies, who typically 
are required by company legislation to put the interests of the company first.  This can 
cause problems where the directors are representatives of participating organisations, 
and thus may not be able adequately to reflect their interests.   
 
Corrigan, Steele and Parston (2001) argue that the use of such public interest forms of 
legal governance would enable greater opportunity to innovate, and yet remain 
accountable to and work in the interest of the wider community.  This is a model that 
might have advantages for partnerships which wish to incorporate so that they are able 
to employ staff, enter into contracts and act on their own behalf, yet where 
accountability to the community is particularly important and the idea of a company 
limited by guarantee does not seem appropriate. 
 
The decision on the legal form to utilise will be influenced by two factors.  The first 
factor is the type of PPP, discussed by Hodge, Greve and Boardman (2010).  Each 
type of PPP is better suited to one of the forms of legal governance discussed above.  
Thus, long term infrastructure contracts would normally be best suited to a company 
form of legal governance, while in institutional co-operation for joint production a 
public corporation model could provide the necessary framework.  Although there are 
no hard and fast rules about which legal form fits best which type of PPP, there are 
clearly some general indications (table 2). 
 
---- table 2 about here ---- 
 
Second, the choice of legal form reflects the extent to which the constituent parties 
agree to integrate their activities into a separate entity.  PPPs can be loose associations 
in which partners maximise their autonomy consistent with undertaking some 
collective activity, or agree to combine their resources into a new entity of which they 
are members but not necessarily in a controlling position.  This is the classic joint 
venture, a new body established by a set of organisations on the basis that its 
independence would generate benefits for them.  Over time, partners‟ attitudes to 
integration or autonomy will change.  And so the temporal aspects of partnership 
formation and incorporation are important to understand.  It may take a period of 
operation as a MoU PPP before the partners will be willing to move to greater 
integration as a company.  
 
Regulatory governance 
 
Regulatory governance concerns the system of rules that connect the PPP to the public 
client.  It covers the legal and contractual obligations on parties, the procedures 
through which they are enforced, and the softer norms that operate around these.  It is 
what Koch and Buser (2006: 551) term „metagovernance‟: „various types of soft law, 
incentives, guidelines, brokering activities and legal mechanisms‟.   Because 
government is the guarantor of last resort for a project, market incentives on the PPP 
and its commercial partners are reduced.  Thus there is a corresponding need for 
effective regulatory oversight to assure the public‟s policy and fiscal interests are 
served.  Problems of governmental capacity are even more pronounced in developing 
and transitional states.  A case study of China‟s urban water sector shows that the 
fragmentation and diversity of the regulatory systems inhibits the effective 
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involvement of foreign direct investment in PPPs to improve water management 
(Zhong, Mol and Fu 2008).    
 
At the most fundamental level, the public client will be subject to legal requirements 
concerning the process to be followed and criteria to be applied in the procurement of 
private actors to participate in a PPP.  The scope, detail and complexity of these legal 
rules will vary from country to country.  In the European Union, for example, there is 
a set of procurement regulations that apply to all member states (Maslyukivska and 
Sohail 2007).  This compares with, for example, China, where the public law 
framework is more limited due to the tradition of state ownership of production and 
absence until recently of significant private actors in a market context.  Here, the legal 
framework was inadequate to enable effective separation of public and private assets, 
and only recently has legislation to protect private assets been introduced into the 
legal code (Adams, Young and Zhihong 2006).   
 
The rationale for such overarching legal frameworks is to provide transparency for the 
process of determining the selection of the private actor to participate in a PPP, and 
the way in which public and private resources will be applied to the PPP.  This 
creates, at least in theory, a level playing field for potential investors, as well as 
prescribing mechanisms for the resolution of any disputes and agreement of contract 
variations.  Given the scale of infrastructure PPPs, such frameworks should reduce the 
risk of corruption and opportunism.  They should also ensure that the public interest is 
protected, for example by requiring security bonds to be issued against financial 
default or non-performance by the private actor (Deng, Tian, Ding and Boase 2003).  
However Bloomfield (2006) points out that in the US case, if not elsewhere, the 
unique structure of PPPs combined with an environment in which deregulation is the 
norm leads to a situation in which there may be special waivers of standard 
procurement procedures. 
 
There has been a considerable discussion in the literature about the value or otherwise 
of legal as opposed to quasi-legal and relational contracting (Sullivan and Skelcher 
2002).  PPPs require some form of legal contract because they involve public 
resources.  However the question is whether the interaction between the parties should 
be regulated as a matter of legal obligations, and thus tested through the courts, or by 
way of quasi-legal arbitration mechanisms or through softer forms of regulation.  The 
solutions to these problems are inevitably contingent.  Societal norms and the 
underlying attitudes towards the way in which business should be conducted will be 
important determinants.  The impartiality of the courts may or may not be assured.  
And the imperatives for project delivery may also be important considerations, with 
speed of delivery leading to a more pragmatic approach to contract relations on the 
part of public actors.    
 
Arbitration mechanisms provide a reasonable middle way between legalistic and 
informal modes of regulatory governance, provided the social infrastructure can offer 
a reasonable guarantee of impartiality.  They offer the parties an opportunity to put 
their cases before a knowledgeable but independent arbitrator or arbitration panel, 
who may be able to identify and broker solutions not previously considered by the 
parties.  In Europe and some other parts of the world it is now common practice for 
construction contracts to include provision for arbitration prior to any legal dispute 
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resolution.  Professional associations may offer their own arbitration service, enabling 
a process of peer judgement to be applied. 
 
Relational contracting occurs where the parties engage in dialogue about issues 
arising from the interpretation of contracts, unforeseen events, changes in operating 
conditions, or external contingencies that affect implementation of the PPP.  This is 
often mistakenly presented as a softer form of regulatory governance, but can be quite 
hard edged.  Private actors can deploy negotiating and commercial relationships skills 
for which public actors are unprepared, including the practice of offloading less 
profitable parts of the operation to third parties over whom there is less control and 
attempting to renegotiate aspects of the contract as it is being implemented.   
 
The unfortunate conflation of relational contracting with the idea of „trust‟ adds to the 
problems public actors can face, since it creates the impression that all that is required 
are good inter-personal relations.  Rather, trust should be considered as a measure of 
predictability of behaviour.  The behaviour could be virtuous or wicked from a public 
interest perspective, and thus trust is a normatively neutral concept rather than one 
associated with positive virtues.  Predictability would be a better concept to use, in the 
sense that it avoids the normative baggage of „trust‟.  Thus, a public client might well 
predict on the basis of past experience that a given private actor would behave 
opportunistically.  In this sense, a healthy dose of mistrust would be beneficial for the 
public interest! 
 
Governments can assist public actors to minimise problems of regulatory governance, 
and avoid legal dispute resolution, by generating and transferring knowledge from 
PPP experience.  Research on the German case shows that PPP Task Forces and 
Knowledge Centres can improve procurement processes and enhance value for money 
(Fischer, Jungbecker and Alfen 2006).   In the Netherlands, the PPP Competence 
Centre provides a similar role, and there are equivalent bodies in a number of other 
countries.  Bodies such as Partnerships Victoria, a division of the Victorian State 
Government in Australia, take this approach one step further by providing a single 
gateway for potential PPP projects, bringing together both expertise in developing and 
managing PPPs with public interest considerations.   
 
Democratic governance 
 
PPPs raise important issues of democratic governance due to the changed nature of 
the state when it transfers public responsibilities in whole or in part to third parties, or 
engages in cooperative activities with third parties.  Ranson and Stewart argue that: 
„Organisations in the public domain are required to account for their actions in the 
public arena of discourse and there has to be a means by which they are held to 
account by the public on whose behalf they act.‟ (1994: 94)  But forms of third party 
government like PPPs muddy the waters of accountability.  They introduce the 
problem of the „democratic deficit‟, which refers to the shortfall in the accountability 
arrangements of a non-elected public body with reference to those applying in the 
elected sector.  This is not just a matter of whether electoral arrangements do or do not 
exist, but also to the other systems that support democratic accountability including 
access to information and codes regulating standards of conduct (Sands 2006). 
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PPPs embody two potentially competing institutional logics – the logic of democratic 
accountability in a public arena and the logic of commercial competitiveness in a 
private setting.  Thus, for democrats PPPs are too private and lack the transparency 
normally associated with governmental activity.  That transparency covers input, 
throughput, and output stages in the policy process.  In contrast, the prevailing logic in 
business is to see accountability at the output/outcome stage – in terms of sales to 
customers and profit to owners.  This is the pre-Corporate Social Responsibility 
(CSR) market logic, in which why and how a good or service is designed and 
produced is immaterial to the customer; what matters is whether it does what the 
customer expects, or can be persuaded to expect.  CSR is changing the orientation of 
business to give greater attention to input and throughout considerations (for example, 
the sourcing of products from renewal stock and the ethics of employment conditions 
in a global market).  But CSR remains a matter of debate in the face of a deeply 
embedded institutional logic of competitiveness in which global production obviates a 
level ethical playing field for the foreseeable future. 
 
This raises the empirical and normative question of what is, and what should be, the 
level and form of constitutional oversight of PPPs? (Bovaird 2004; Skelcher 2005)  
Currently, oversight other than of outputs is limited.  There are plenty of reports by 
government audit agencies on the results of using PPP mechanisms, and some interim 
analysis, for example of the application of the public sector comparator in particular 
cases (e.g. from the UK‟s National Audit Office).  These are sometimes considered by 
relevant committees of state and national legislatures, or by ministers.  But public 
oversight and debate about individual PPPs as they develop is much more limited.   
 
This is not just a matter of commercial confidentiality.  Pro-PPP governments benefit 
from this opacity given the sometimes very marginal decisions made in public sector 
comparator analysis, and the opportunities to massage the assumptions fed into the 
process (National Audit Office 2001).  More fundamentally, the problem of 
classification comes into play.  PPPs are a form of quasi-governmental body, yet like 
other quangos they emerge through pragmatic and ad hoc processes and in a 
multiplicity of forms (Guttman 2003).  They are frequently a function of executive 
rather than legislative decision and thus comprise a judgment about technically 
appropriate means rather than public policy ends.  The creation of effective 
constitutional oversight requires as a first step the clear demarcation of this class of 
organizations.   
 
Corporate governance 
 
Corporate governance concerns „the procedures associated with the decision-making, 
performance and control of organisations, with providing structures to give overall 
direction to the organisation and to satisfy reasonable expectations of accountability to 
those outside it (Hodges, Wright and Keasey 1996: 7).  Its focus is on the 
organisation‟s board, the roles of chief executive, the chair of the board, directors and 
senior management, in the context of structures and systems for strategy, financial and 
risk management.  Essentially, corporate governance concerns itself with ensuring 
that the enterprise is managed in a manner that does not put the future of the business 
and investors funds at undue risk.   
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We know very little about the corporate governance of PPPs.  This is an issue where 
few researchers have ventured.  In part this may be due to problems of access into an 
arena where commercial and political sensitivities are pronounced.  But it may also be 
that the academic debate has concentrated on the theoretical, financial and substantive 
pros and cons of PPPs at the expense of empirical examination of their internal 
workings.  Some literature is now beginning to appear.  Johnston and Gudergan 
(2007) use the case of Sydney‟s Cross City Tunnel to show how the different 
incentives operating on public and private partners threatened the viability of the PPP 
Company and ultimately caused its collapse.  Rubin and Stankiewicz (2001) provide a 
detailed analysis of the Los Angeles Community Development Bank, an innovative 
PPP for economic revitalization.  However, we still lack a sufficient number of 
detailed studies of the day-to-day corporate governance of PPPs.   
 
The two studies cited above both reveal that the structural tensions built into a PPP, 
by virtue of operating both in public and business environments, have a significant 
impact on the viability of the two examples.  This suggests that there is a particular 
challenge for the development of systems of corporate governance for PPPs.  The PPP 
cannot be regarded as a unitary organisation with a singular institutional logic.  
Rather, it is a multi-organisation encompassing several institutional logics.  It is also 
an open system, where the external environment can have a significant and immediate 
impact – for example, a change in government policy.  The approach to corporate 
governance may therefore need to be more flexible and adaptive than is 
conventionally the case, mediated through broker or boundary-spanning roles that 
facilitate early warning of changes in the environment and the opportunity for 
dialogue and negotiation at an early stage (Baker 2008).   
 
PPP governance: key imperatives and conditions 
 
The legal, regulatory, democratic and corporate governance of PPPs are all concerned 
with managing the risks inherent in third party government (Salamon 1981).  These 
risks are well understood at a theoretical level in the institutional economics 
framework, with its concern for the analysis of principal-agent relations under 
different governance regimes.  However scholars need to explore other areas of theory 
that have the potential to offer new insights into the governance of PPPs.  For 
example, political science has a conceptual language to describe the accountability, 
transparency and public interest issues involved with PPPs, but the theoretical 
formulations relevant to third party governance are less well developed.  Equally, 
methods of analysis are still relatively simplistic due to the domination of approaches 
oriented to elected bodies (Mathur and Skelcher 2007).  Thus the prescriptions 
generated by this discipline not so well advanced.  Newer areas of theory, for example 
complexity science, can make a contribution to understanding the structure and 
evolution of PPPs under different and changing environmental conditions, for 
example through the use of concepts such as „fitness landscape‟ (Klijn 2008).  In 
essence, my argument is that scholars need to expand from the tried and tested areas 
of theory and search out literatures that can generate new understandings of PPPs and 
in the process inform public debate, policy and practice.    
 
The significance of national contextual factors, discussed earlier in this chapter, mean 
than generic prescriptions for PPP governance need to be expressed at a relatively 
 9 
broad level.  Smith, Mathur and Skelcher (2006) offer a set of such generic 
prescriptions based on their study of partnerships in the UK, which are adapted here: 
1. Deliberative governance design:  The process of governance design should 
be deliberative, engaging those groups and agencies relevant to the 
partnership‟s policy goals in exploring and determining the governance 
form.  
2. Proportionality:  The governance systems should be proportional to the 
responsibilities and risks of the partnership.  Some PPP spend considerable 
amounts of money and have a major impact on the community; others 
have few resources and are essentially about facilitating cooperative effort.  
3. Balancing performance with conformance:  PPPs are created to deliver 
projects.  This performance imperative needs to be balanced against 
conformance with regulatory conditions.   
4. Facilitating new legal forms: The limitations of public company forms are 
well known. The debate on “public interest companies” and co-operative 
legal entities offers an important way forward.  
5. Mechanisms for public accountability:  There should be a regular and 
stable process whereby the intentions, decisions and actions of a PPP can 
be exposed to the scrutiny of the public.  Accountability should not rest 
purely on the output side of the policy process. 
 
This discussion of the various aspects of PPP governance brings us back to the 
constituting conditions for public action.  These require government that works in the 
wider public interest, follows proper standards of conduct, is transparent in its 
decision-making, and is accountable to citizens.  It is clear to see how this might 
operate in an elected body or executive agency, but it becomes more complex for a 
PPP because of the different legal forms that it could take, the tendency to weaker 
standards of corporate governance, and the principal-agent problems in effective 
regulation.  And underlying these differences is the fundamental tension with which 
we started the chapter – that between tighter governance to protect the public interest 
on the one hand, and on the other the case for weaker governance to enable risk-
taking and innovation, and incentivised private actor participation in the provision of 
public services and infrastructure. 
 
In conclusion, the key task in developing the governance of PPPs is less to do with 
their financial probity, and more with aligning their mode of operating to the 
fundamental democratic values of the wider public service.  The flexibility in legal 
and corporate governance available to PPPs offers the opportunity for interesting and 
creative ways of addressing this imperative.  Thus far, the governance of PPPs has 
predominantly been used to remove them from public scrutiny and informed debate, 
justified on the grounds of commercial confidentiality or managerial discretion.  But, 
as I argued at the start of this chapter, PPPs are inherently instruments of public 
action.  The challenge for normative theory and institutional design is to ensure that 
the public purpose of PPPs is properly expressed in the form of governance and its 
constitutive rules, and is subjugated neither to an ideology of commercialization nor 
an alternative form of governance arising from the formalized practices of the private 
actors involved in managing a PPP. 
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Table 1: Structures for legal governance of PPPs 
 
Legal form Description Primary accountability  
Public 
corporation 
Statutory body created through 
legislation and with defined duties and 
powers.  This creates a public entity that 
incorporates the various parties in a 
PPP.  May be employed in place of 
incorporation as a company. 
To government 
Company limited 
by shares 
A body incorporated as a company 
limited by shares.  Members of the 
company will be the parties in the 
partnership.  Shares may be owned by 
the parties, or may be traded in the open 
market, thus diluting control.  However 
government may hold a 51% stake or a 
„golden share‟ in order to retain the final 
say in the public interest. 
To the members, 
shareholders, and others 
as required by the 
legislation governing 
companies. 
Company limited 
by guarantee 
As above, except there are no 
shareholders.  Members of the company 
agree to pay a nominal amount against 
any debts of the company in event that it 
ceases trading.  
To the members, and 
others as required by the 
legislation governing 
companies. 
Memorandum of 
understanding/un
incorporated 
association 
A non-corporate entity, in which the 
partners agree to work together for the 
objectives, and in the ways, set out in a 
non-legally binding memorandum of 
understanding.  Because it is not a 
corporate entity, the PPP cannot enter 
into contracts or hold funds.  These 
functions are normally undertaken on 
behalf of the PPP by one of the partners‟ 
organisations. 
To the members. 
 
Source: Adapted from Sullivan and Skelcher 2002 
 
 13 
Table 2: Indicative relationships between legal forms and PPP types 
 
PPP type Indicative legal form Rationale 
Institutional cooperation 
for joint production and 
risk sharing 
Public corporation Maintains state 
involvement in 
management of production 
and risk 
Long term infrastructure 
contracts 
Company or contract Enables partners to 
manage finances and 
contracts.  Company 
enables opportunities to 
seek additional financing 
through sale of equity 
stakes 
Public policy networks Memorandum of 
understanding 
Offers flexibility for looser 
network arrangements 
Civil society and 
community development 
Memorandum of 
understanding or public 
interest company 
Offers flexibility for 
variety of civil society 
organisations; or legal 
structure in which public 
interest is basis of 
governance rules 
Urban renewal and 
downtown economic 
development 
Company Enables partners to 
undertake range of 
activities associated with 
renewal, including 
infrastructure works, 
marketing, start-up 
financing 
 
